EECS 510: Advanced Seminar on Algorithmic Mechanism Design

Contents: Description details Announcements Schedule Links

Description

The course goal is to expose students to the research frontiers in algorithmic mechanism design from the context provided by the classic economics literature.  Students will read recent papers in algorithmic mechanism design and classic works from economics.  These papers will be presented, discussed, and compared in class.   The course will cover some materials complementing the topics covered in Algorithmic Mechanism Design (EECS 495, Spring 2010).  While students are not required to have taken this course to participate in the seminar, students are encouraged to follow the course notes as needed <http://users.eecs.northwestern.edu/~hartline/amd.pdf>.  One of the main goals of this seminar is to critically contrast standard models in CS and economics literature; papers will often be considered in pairs that will be drawn one from CS and one from economics.  Differences in paired papers will suggest research directions that students will be encouraged to pursue.  All attendees (regardless of registration for the course) will be expected to read each pair of papers in advance of each class take the lead in discussing one or two papers.

 

Details

Lectures: Tuesday 3:30-6:30
Location: Ford 3.340

Jason Hartline, Azarakhsh Malekian
Email: hartline at eecs dot northwestern dot edu
         a-malekian at eecs dot northwestern dot edu

Announcements

  •  Each class will consist of presentations and discussion. Students will be required to present papers (50%) . A significant portion of the grade will be based on class participation, which includes class discussion and demonstrations (50%). There will be no exams.

    Schedule

    Topic Date Presenter Reading List
      09/28/10 David Malec Pricing Randomized Allocations
     Briest, Chawla, Kleinberg, and Weinberg
    Supplementary Reading:  Chapter 7 of AMD
      09/05/10 Nima Hagh Panah
    Bach Q Ha
    Budget Feasible Mechanisms
    Yaron Singer
    Auction design with a risk averse seller
    Peter Eso,  Gabor Futo
      10/11/10 Manolis Pountourakis
    Darrell Hoy
    Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading
    Roger Myerson, Mark Satterthwaite
    Beyond Moulin Mechanisms
    A. Mehta, T Roughgarden, M. Sundarajan
      10/18/10 Greg Stoddard

    Azarakhsh Malekian

    Multi Unit Auctions with Budget Limits
    Shahar Dobzinsky, Noam Nisan Ron Lavi
    Auctions, Development and Privatization: Efficient Auctions with Liquidity Constrained Buyers
    Eric Maskin
      10/25/10 Nima Hagh Panah

    Darrell Hoy

    Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading
    Roger Myerson, Mark Satterthwaite
    Frugal and Truthful Auctions for Vertex Covers, Flows, and Cuts
    David kempe, Mahyar Salek, Christopher Moore
      11/02/10 Nima Hagh Panah
    Bach Q Ha
    Frugal and Truthful Auctions for Vertex Covers, Flows, and Cuts
    David kempe, Mahyar Salek, Christopher Moore
    Envy-Free Makespan Approximation
    Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky
      11/08/10 Manolis Pountourakis
    Greg Stoddard

    Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation
    Moshe Babaioff, Robert D. Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Slivkins
    Information Overhead of Incentive Compatibility
    Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Moni Naor, Michael Schapira

     

      11/16/10 David Malec
    Thanh Nguyen
     Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
    Cremer, J. and R. McLean
    On Optimal Single-Item Auctions
    Christos Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos
      11/30/10 Nima Hagh Panah Implementation Theory
    Eric Maskin
    A crash course in implementation theory
    Matthew Jackson

    Links