The course goal is to expose students to the research frontiers in
algorithmic mechanism design from the context provided by the classic economics
literature. Students will read recent papers in algorithmic mechanism design
and classic works from economics. These papers will be presented, discussed,
and compared in class. The course will cover some materials complementing the
topics covered in Algorithmic Mechanism Design (EECS 495, Spring 2010). While
students are not required to have taken this course to participate in the
seminar, students are encouraged to follow the course notes as needed <http://users.eecs.
| Topic | Date | Presenter | Reading List |
| 09/28/10 | David Malec |
Pricing Randomized
Allocations Briest, Chawla, Kleinberg, and Weinberg Supplementary Reading: Chapter 7 of AMD |
|
| 09/05/10 | Nima Hagh Panah Bach Q Ha |
Budget Feasible Mechanisms Yaron Singer Auction design with a risk averse seller Peter Eso, Gabor Futo |
|
| 10/11/10 | Manolis Pountourakis Darrell Hoy |
Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading Roger Myerson, Mark Satterthwaite Beyond Moulin Mechanisms A. Mehta, T Roughgarden, M. Sundarajan |
|
| 10/18/10 | Greg Stoddard Azarakhsh Malekian |
Multi Unit Auctions with Budget Limits Shahar Dobzinsky, Noam Nisan Ron Lavi Auctions, Development and Privatization: Efficient Auctions with Liquidity Constrained Buyers Eric Maskin |
|
| 10/25/10 | Nima Hagh Panah Darrell Hoy |
Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading Roger Myerson, Mark Satterthwaite Frugal and Truthful Auctions for Vertex Covers, Flows, and Cuts David kempe, Mahyar Salek, Christopher Moore |
|
| 11/02/10 | Nima Hagh Panah Bach Q Ha |
Frugal and Truthful
Auctions for Vertex Covers, Flows, and Cuts David kempe, Mahyar Salek, Christopher Moore Envy-Free Makespan Approximation Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky |
|
| 11/08/10 | Manolis Pountourakis Greg Stoddard |
Truthful Mechanisms with
Implicit Payment Computation
|
|
| 11/16/10 | David Malec Thanh Nguyen |
Full
Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
Cremer, J. and R. McLean On Optimal Single-Item Auctions Christos Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos |
|
| 11/30/10 | Nima Hagh Panah |
Implementation Theory Eric Maskin A crash course in implementation theory Matthew Jackson |